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 Advancing botnet threats in cyberspace threaten the security of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) Information Network (DODIN) and have the potential to overwhelm the 
Defensive Cyber Forces’ ability to provide timely assessments of network flow information 
due to the sheer volume of traffic. This is a problem because the DOD relies heavily on the 
capacity of the DODIN to command and control forces and achieve strategic objectives. 
This research assesses the performance of various machine learning algorithms on their 
ability to detect various types of botnet traffic using labeled ARGUS data. The research 
utilizes the Bot-IoT dataset that is composed of ARGUS files that summarize network 
traffic flows collected during several different botnet activities including Operating System 
fingerprinting, Service Scan, Data Exfiltration, and Keylogging data. The identification 
and categorization of botnet traffic within labeled data is a classification problem for which 
supervised learning methods are most appropriate. The algorithms explored are Random 
Forest, k-Nearest Neighbor, and Support Vector. The metrics to assess performance of the 
classifiers are sourced from rates of true positive, true negative, false positive and false 
negative. Those rates are used to calculate a score of accuracy, precision, and recall for 
each model on each type of botnet traffic. This research demonstrates that the Random 
Forest model is an effective tool to accurately classify and detect botnet traffic. 
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This research focuses on the analysis of supervised Machine Learning (ML) 
techniques applied to Audit Record Generation and Utilization System (ARGUS) datasets 
to determine the potential application of the techniques on DOD networks to detect 
Botnets. This research explored the optimization of feature selection on four Botnet traffic 
types: Service Scan, OS Fingerprinting, Keylogging, and Data Exfiltration. Subsequently, 
ML models were developed. The models leveraged algorithms obtained from the publicly 
available Scikit Learning suite of capabilities and were tailored to meet the objectives of 
this research. The ML models were applied to selections of features organized by 
importance and traffic types. After training and testing the models on each of the traffic 
types, the performance of each model was compared to one another. 
B. MOTIVATION 
The amount of network security related data is overwhelming Defensive Cyber 
Forces (DCFs). While additional defensive cyber forces were commissioned to grapple 
with the ever-increasing challenges associated with defending the DoDIN (Department of 
Defense Information Network), they employ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
that are reactive in nature. DCFs are not manned to maintain a network defender level of 
knowledge on the nuances of the configuration of all networks under their purview. The 
distributed placement of these additional defensive cyber forces renders them ill-equipped 
to respond to threats that are executing in real time. DCFs cannot rely on traditional 
signature-based threat mitigation measures to adequately protect the DoDIN. Nor is it 
feasible or cost effective to man DCFs to the level necessary to review millions of lines of 
log data to detect unknown threats as they occur. DCFs require capabilities that employ 
user friendly ML technology and techniques that help automate defense analysis processes 
and reduce the number of alerts that need to be investigated. 
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C. SCOPE 
This research makes evaluations and recommendations on appropriate ML models, 
algorithms, and methods to apply towards the analysis of ARGUS network flows. The 
DOD does not currently employ capabilities or methods at Network Operations Centers 
(NOCs) that are able to identify unknown cyber threats. This thesis intends to provide 
recommendations of capabilities that could be employed to close this gap. For example, 
the capabilities used to counter known threats are effective if DCFs meticulously ensure 
that threat signatures are current which requires diligent monitoring of intelligence on 
emerging threats. However, this provides little to no protection against zero-day attacks 
and other unknown exploits for which there is no signature-based defense. This research 
will focus on supervised Machine Learning methods that can be employed with minimal 
training and expertise to detect malicious Botnet activity. The implementation of 
capabilities of this kind would enable DOD to detect Botnets faster than could be achieved 
by any current team of defensive cyber forces.  
The ML models we developed may be applied as an investigative tool but will not 
serve the same function as a firewall, intrusion protection system/intrusion detection 
system (IPS/IDS), access control list (ACL), or another traditional network security device. 
The ML algorithms enable the analysis of network output from ARGUS for the 
aforementioned traffic types but will not include all performance and subprograms which 
enable core capabilities including processing requirements, output speed, power 
requirements, Command and Control (C2) requirements, and all associated software/
hardware requirements. 
Initial plans for this research included conducting a user study to further explore 
use of ML in the practical domain. Unfortunately, time restrictions and the additional 
requirements encompassed within that endeavor required us to omit the objective from our 
research.  
D. OBJECTIVES 
The intent of this research is to answer three questions: (1) what operations and 
maintenance considerations apply to long term utilization of ML algorithms against Botnet 
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traffic; (2) which, if any, existing Machine Learning algorithms or techniques could be 
usefully applied to analyze network flow data: and (3) what caveats/limitations must be 
considered by consumers of alerts produced by ML analysis of network flow data?  The 
scope of this research is limited to the analysis of ARGUS network flows. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that NOCs have the capability to 
conduct packet captures and convert them into ARGUS formatted comma separated value 
(CSV) file. It is also assumed that there are sufficient resources available for the 
employment of the recommendations of this research. Sufficient resources include but are 
not limited to a Linux operating system with enough processing capability to run Python 
scripts and Scikit Learn modules.  
F. APPROACH 
The overall approach is to conduct tests of various ML algorithms on individual 
types of Botnet traffic. First, a publicly available dataset was used as a source to generate 
datasets of the four types of traffic: Service Scan, OS Fingerprinting, Keylogging, and Data 
Exfiltration. Three models were developed, and an iterative approach was applied to the 
training and test datasets to compare the efficiency of each model. Using the results of each 
model on each dataset, tables and graphs were developed to determine which models were 
best suited to identify Botnet traffic over a range of metrics and what factors contributed 
to their success.  
G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This research will consolidate and assess the successes of current Machine Learning 
capabilities to detect threats without relying upon malicious threat signature repositories. 
It will inform the design requirements of ML models that will aid in investigative analysis. 
It is an analysis of the application of available algorithms and methods to detect 




Chapter II provides background on Botnets, Botnet traffic, machine-learning 
algorithms, and historical relevancy of this research. Chapter III describes the model 
design. Chapter IV discusses the results of the experimentation. Finally, Chapter V 
provides research conclusions, findings and suggests possible avenues for future research 
to expand on the methodology, data, and lessons learned from this research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Experts equipped with a broad range of tools and capabilities aid in the defense of 
networks against a myriad of threats. The internet environment is constantly in flux as new 
defensive mechanisms as well as new threats are introduced. One such tool that has been 
weaponized for nefarious behaviors is a Botnet. Emerging academic publications have 
consistently identified the need for capabilities that counter previously unidentified 
Botnets. Therefore, an analysis on the application of probabilistic detections capabilities 
towards the defense of the Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN) is 
imperative. As defensive cyber forces are already oversaturated with information, 
additional defensive capabilities may serve to improve detection, analytics, collaboration, 
response, and reporting to anomalies and threats. The academic & scientific communities 
have made significant achievements in the development of probabilistic models, methods, 
and technologies supporting a broader effort to further identify and classify threats.  
B. BOTS AND BOTNETS 
Internet robots, commonly called bots, have existed since the late 1980s in the form 
of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) bots (Knecht, 2016). The earliest bots served to keep chat 
servers from shutting down chat rooms due to inactivity. Since then, bots have been 
evolved to serve a myriad of purposes from chat management to workload reduction. In 
2000 the GTbot was discovered, masquerading as an mIRC client program and was used 
to launch various denial of service (DoS) attacks (Knecht, 2016). In 2007, a massive bot 
network (Botnet), named Storm, was discovered. Estimates indicated upwards of 50 
million computers had been infected with malware correlating to Botnets (Knecht, 2016) 
and were being used for various cybercrimes. Botnets are networks of connected devices 
which have been infected with malicious software and can be remotely controlled through 
what is commonly referred to as a “Command and Control (C2) Server.”  In most cases, 
infected devices act as sleeping agents, otherwise known as zombies. Once infected, these 
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zombies can be activated to carry out a variety of exploits or malicious activities. For the 
remainder of our research, the terms bots, Botnets, and zombies refer to malicious bots. 
Understanding the proliferation of Botnets aids in constructing a more complete 
picture as to why pose a substantial threat. Even in the early stages of the Botnet 
development, cyber criminals recognized the need for bots to install themselves onto client 
machines (Knecht, 2016). Several propagation methods for bot binary (a bot installation 
software) to become installed on a computer. While we will not delve into the details of 
the various methods employed to propagate Botnets, common methods include emails 
links, media devices, executables, drive-by downloads, and scanning for hosts with known 
vulnerabilities. Some of these methods leverage social engineering and common 
penetration techniques which allow the bot binary to be quickly downloaded (Khattak et 
al., 2014). Once downloaded, the bot establishes communication with the C2 server where 
it becomes part of the Botnet and can be used by the botmaster, an entity that directs the 
actions of bots under their control. 
Botnets are ideal tools for many cybercriminals. The advent of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) has greatly increased the demand for Botnets as cyber hackers have 
recognized that many devices lack sufficient encryption, utilize low quality hardware or 
software, and can be easily infected to support Botnets (Agazzi, 2020). Botnets offer 
computing power and a level of anonymity to the botmaster. One can easily deduce how a 
large network of controlled devices can enable a plethora of attack vectors for savvy 
botmasters. Attacks such as “Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS), Keylogging, 
Phishing, Spamming, Click fraud, Identity theft, and even the proliferation of other Bot 
malware” (Koroniotis et al., 2019) all become substantially more effective with the 
employment of Botnets. The botmaster’s indirect relationship between the bots and the C2 
server lays the stepping stones for avoiding detection and discover (Khattak et al., 2014). 
Botnets are particularly problematic because they are very hard to detect due to the malware 
that affects the devices root themselves at the X layer, which are deeper than the application 
or user layer by which most users interact (IBM Security, 2016). Once infected, the bots 
are subsequently controlled by a botmaster through a C2 infrastructure  (Koroniotis et al., 
2019). 
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C. OVERVIEW OF MACHINE LEARNING 
Navy Network Operations Centers (NOCs) employ tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that are reactive in nature: “Typical detectors are based on traditional intrusion 
detection techniques, focusing on identifying Botnets based on existing signatures of 
attacks by examining the behavior of underlying malicious activities” (Zhao et al., 2013). 
NOCs cannot rely on traditional signature-based threat mitigation measures to DoDIN. 
They require capabilities that employ user friendly Machine Learning technology and 
techniques that determine threats probabilistically based on a priori configurations.  
D. ALGORITHMS 
Numerous studies of Machine Learning algorithms have been successfully 
conducted to support the claim that Machine Learning can be an accurate tool to detect, 
classify, and enhance capabilities to identify Botnet attacks. “Machine Learning is an 
application of Artificial Intelligence wherein the system gets the ability to automatically 
learn and improve based on experience” (Geron, 2017). Machine Learning helps users to 
collect, track, and analyze data much more efficiently than if they were utilizing standard 
data analysis by collecting and storing in a database to be represented on spreadsheets. 
Classification is a subset of Supervised Learning in which data comes with additional 
attributes on which a prediction is made in the field of Machine Learning, classification 
problems require the use of a classifier. Classifiers are algorithms that can learn to detect 
and classify types of traffic based on their features. In our research, these classifiers will 
be incorporated into models written using the programming language Python. In supervised 
learning, examples which consist of labeled data are used to train a Machine Learning 
algorithm. The trained Machine Learning algorithm will then be used to make prediction 
on new data. When a user employs supervised learning methods, the user already has all 
the information required, and the Machine Learning tool can then be used to correlate 
features to the appropriately labeled data (Geron, 2017). In this case, the tool will predict 
whether the network traffic is the result of a malicious Botnet or just normal traffic.  The 
classifiers that will be explored are Random Forest, k-Nearest Neighbor, and Support 
Vector.  
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1. Random Forest 
Random Forests are composed of an ensemble of Decision Trees. A Decision Tree 
is a tree shaped diagram wherein each branch of the tree represents a possible decision that 
is made on the data. These decisions at each branch are made according to the values of 
the features of the data. Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of method in which a 
Decision Tree would use distinguishable features to differentiate between two different 
objects. The branch structures that perform successful classification and are also common 
amongst the most trees are chosen by the random forest as the final decision tree structure.  
 
Illustrates the process by which a Decision Tree Algorithm would make a classification 
prediction. 
Figure 1. Decision Tree Algorithm. 
2. K-Nearest Neighbor 
The k-Nearest Neighbor (Figure 2) is the simplest of supervised Machine Learning 
algorithms. It classifies a data point based on how its neighbors are classified. The k-
Nearest Neighbor algorithm classifies each new instance by calculating the distance 
between the new instance and the distance of the labeled instances in the trained model. If 
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most of the labeled instances are of a certain class then new instance is classified by the k-
nearest neighbor algorithm as that same class. In the example given by Figure 2 two out of 
three of the closest labeled instances to the new instance are green triangles, so the new 
instance is classified as a green triangle.  
 
Figure 2. K-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm. Source: Geron (2017). 
3. Support Vector 
A Support Vector classifier groups classes of data (Figure 3) entries using their 
distinguishing characteristics and estimates the optimal linear separation between the 
groups. The Support Vector algorithm classifies each new instance by observing where the 
new instances reside with respect to the vector that separates the classes in the trained 
model. In the example given by Figure 3 the new instance is on the side of the vector 
populated by green triangles, so the new instance is classified as a green triangle.  
10 
   
Figure 3. Support Vector Algorithm. Source: Geron (2017). 
4. Approach to Model Design 
There are two predominant emerging approaches to the detection of bots: detection 
using network flow based features and detection using graph-based features (Chowdhury 
et al., 2017). A network flow is a sequence of packets over some amount of time that are 
organized by a set of identifying features. A common software platform for converting data 
to network flow format is ARGUS. “ARGUS data is designed specifically for flow feature-
based, as well as early and sub-flow-based, traffic analytics and classification” 
(openargus.org, n.d.).  
The methodologies for previous research on Machine Learning vary significantly. 
Therefore, there is very little foundation from which to structure a uniform approach and 
apply those results towards NOC traffic analysis. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
has an elegant and simple structure that fits well with the defenders of the DoDIN. Han’s 
research, Individual Adoption of Information Systems in Organizations (Han, 2003), 
highlights the benefits of applying TAM to emerging technologies compared with other 
methods. TAM considers two drivers to adoption, perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness. Despite demonstrating high detection accuracy, deep inspection of the contents 
of network traffic is typically resource intensive and requires the parsing of large amounts 
of packet data which is a slow process. Therefore, the usefulness of conducting deep 
inspection of network traffic is progressively diminishing. Additionally, if a Botnet 
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employs encryption to conceal communications then it defeats the deeper inspection 
capabilities.  
Network flow based traffic analysis is founded on the idea that there is homogeneity 
in Botnet traffic behavior. The features of Botnet traffic are used to distinguish them from 
normal traffic and further classify and and typify the traffic types (Zhao et al., 2013). This 
method of analysis performs classification based on features that cannot be evaded by 
encryption.  (Zhao D. T., 2013) make the case for classification techniques with a high 
performance for the purposes of real time detection while simultaneously exhibiting high 
detection accuracy. Over the course of their individual research pursuits, they investigated 
several Machine Learning techniques for Botnet detection through network behavior 
analysis, including, Neural Networks, Support Vector classifiers, and k-Nearest Neighbor 
classifiers (Saad et al., 2011), and Bayes and Decision Tree (Zhao et al., 2012). There is 
potential to build upon the findings of their individual research efforts. Outside the Closed 
World (Sommer & Paxson, 2010) argued for the need of the system to be understood from 
a capabilities and limitations perspective. Upon delivery of ML capabilities to defensive 
cyber forces, operation of the ML capability must be as user friendly as possible to ensure 
that implementation is seamless and that capabilities are adopted quickly. The 
implementation of an ML capability should not require burdensome or overly difficult 
training for users to understand how to detect threats. The assessment of Machine Learning 
algorithms and techniques in this research will attempt to address perceived ease of use 
and perceived usefulness to potential users of any ML capability while also determining 
which existing Machine Learning algorithms or techniques can be usefully applied for 
detection of Botnets. 
Previous researchers have used different datasets to conduct their research based 
upon the dataset’s applicability to the goals of their research. Many have also used rates of 
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN) for 
the evaluation of methods to detect Botnets. These terms are subject to various definitions 
based on the structure of the experiment being performed. For the purpose of this research 
the following are TP, TN, FP, and FN within the context of this topic. A TP is when a 
model correctly classifies the traffic as Botnet traffic (Salazar, 2018). A TN is when the 
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model correctly classifies the traffic as normal traffic (Salazar, 2018). An FP is when the 
model incorrectly classifies the traffic as Botnet traffic, otherwise known as a type I error  
(Salazar, 2018).  An FN is when the model incorrectly classifies the traffic as normal traffic, 
otherwise known as a type II error (Salazar, 2018). Garcia (2014) leveraged the publicly 
available CTU-13 dataset, a dataset created by Czech Technical University in 2011 
comprised of various types of analogous Botnet traffic, to assess Botnet detection methods. 
They used the ARGUS software suite to convert packet capture (PCAP) files to network 
flows. The detection methods that were used in their research consisted of a variety of 
approaches. Throughout their experimentation, they evaluated their methods using TP, TN, 
FP, and FN. Ding (2018) also assessed Botnet traffic using the CTU-13 dataset. She also 
used ARGUS tools as a method to output network flows which serves to segregate network 
traffic according to features in the network flow data. The Machine Learning algorithms 
used in her research were random forest and naïve Bayesian classifiers. Her research 
demonstrated methods that can be employed on training data to achieve a desirable balance 
between FP and FN.  
There are three formulas that can be leveraged to encompass TP, TN, FP, and FN 
for the evaluation of a model’s ability to classify traffic. Accuracy is the percentage of 
correctly classified instances and is given by TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
. Precision provides insight into 
how FPs are affecting model performance and is given by TP
TP+FP
. Recall provides insight 
into how FNs are affecting model performance and is given by TP
TP+FN
. Koroniotis et al. 
(2019) made Botnet predictions on network traffic using classifiers trained with the Bot-
IoT dataset that they created in their testbed and subsequently made available for public 
use. They also used ARGUS tools to segregate network traffic according to features in the 
network flow data. The Machine Learning models that they used to further eliminate 
superfluous features in their training data consisted of Support Vector, Recurrent Neural 
Network and Long-Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network.  
It is difficult to compare one set of results to another as many studies on Botnet 
detection apply their varying methods and metrics to different datasets which were 
collected in structurally diverse testbeds. In many cases, the datasets are private or only 
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available upon approval (Garcia, 2014). However, the aforementioned results are similar 
in that the classifications were made based on the characteristics of the selected features on 
the observed network flows. While detection methods that rely upon network flow as an 
input are popular, they have received criticism.  
Botnet Detection using Graph-based Feature Clustering, highlights that “network 
flow traffic features rely on computing statistical features of flow traffic. As a result, these 
methods only capture the characteristics of a bot’s effect on individual links, rather than on 
the topological structure of the neighborhood/subgraph as a whole” (Chowdhury et al., 
2017). They further argue that network flow-based traffic analysis does not monitor 
network behaviors in a holistic manner and are more likely to be evaded when attackers 
employ tactics that alter the behavioral characteristics of malicious traffic. If a Machine 
Learning algorithm is being trained with live traffic then it is vulnerable to alterations to 
the traffic which may lead to misclassification of network flow data (Chen et al., 2017). 
Using live traffic to train Machine Learning algorithms may leave it susceptible to 
manipulation or enable hostile agents to alter their data to appear less malicious. In contrast, 
Botnet Detection Based on Traffic Behavior Analysis and Flow Iintervals (Zhao et al., 
2013) heralds the benefits of using netflow characteristics to detect Botnets. Detection 
methods utilizing network traffic characteristics are not subject to the vulnerabilities of 
encryption algorithms  (Zhao et al., 2013). They are computationally cheaper compared to 
earlier methods that depended on deeper inspection of the contents of network traffic. 
Network flows can be split into characteristic time windows to enable quick detection and 
isolate the threat before an attack has made any serious impact. 
According to In Machine Learning for Cybersecurity: Network-based Botnet 
Detection Using Time-Limited Flows (Ding, 2018), the Internet of Things (IoT) provides 
more platforms to launch Botnets attacks such as “smart household devices with built-in 
network capabilities.”  In order to leverage Machine Learning to address the threat posed 
by Botnets, an appropriate dataset must enable proper training of an algorithm to detect 
them. An Empirical Comparison of Botnet Detection Methods (Garcia, 2014) highlights 
the importance for datasets to include ground-truth labels, heterogeneity, or real-world 
traffic. It also presents a methodology by which to compare Botnet detection methods. To 
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the best of our knowledge, the Bot-IoT dataset from Towards the Ddevelopment of 
Realistic Botnet Dataset in the Internet of Things for Network Forensic Analytics 
(Koroniotis et al., 2019) is currently the only one publicly available dataset that provides 
full range of network packet capture which better caters to verifying outcomes (Koroniotis 
et al., 2019). In a comparison of 12 datasets, the Bot-IoT dataset uniquely provides ARGUS 
data, realistic testbed configuration, realistic traffic, labeled data, IoT traces, diverse attack 
scenarios, full packet capture, and new generated features (Koroniotis et al., 2019). The 
dataset consists of 72 million records of Botnet traffic. The testbed was configured to 
simulate normal bidirectional traffic utilizing DNS, email, FTP, HTTP, and SSH servers. 
SSH, Secure Shell, is a protocol that is used to operate network services remotely and 
securelyacross an unsecure network. The simulated normal traffic also consists of IoT 
services encountered in a smart home such as weather station applications, smart 
appliances, motion activated lights, remotely activated garage doors, and smart thermostats 
(Koroniotis et al., 2019). Instead of conducting packet captures of actual Botnets, the 
creators of the Bot-IoT dataset simulated attacks that used Botnet characteristic. The Botnet 
attacks consisted of information gathering, denial of service, and information theft. The 
level of diversity in the testbed traffic developed by Koroniotis et al., (2019) is similar to 
the complex collection of traffic that an Information Systems Security Officer would 
analyze at a Network Operations Center (NOC). 
The Bot-IoT dataset consists of over 73 million total records. The dataset partially 
addresses the issue of real-world traffic by using the Ostinato tool (Koroniotis et al., 2019) 
to generate massive amounts of realistic normal traffic along with periodically inserting 
traffic that makes use of services on the servers within the testbed. Ostinato is a network 
traffic simulation program that enables operators to simulate real traffic characteristics 
within a virtual environment (ostinato.org, n.d.). The issue of ground-truth labeling is 
addressed by ensuring that all traffic within the testbed is appropriately labelled. The large 
number of rows in the dataset account for the “curse of dimensionality.” In the application 
of Machine Learning problems, the curse of dimensionality means that if the number of 
features used to describe the data increases, then the ability of a model to generalize will 
depend upon an exponentially increasing number of samples (Bellman, 1957). Using their 
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“10-best” feature selection, Koroniotis et al. (2019) observed the highest precision and 
recall using a linear support vector classifier (SVC). Their selected features do not include 
details of the specific source and destination. This indicates that malicious traffic may be 
classified based on features independent of source and destination. Some Botnets employ 
techniques that conceal the source of Botnet traffic (Zhao et al., 2013). Since previous 
works have demonstrated that varied behavior between Botnet and normal traffic can be 
exposed through network flow-based Machine Learning methods, this research will 
explore the performance of those methods on subsets of Botnet traffic. This research will 
seek to optimize the combination of feature selections on those subsets of the Bot-IoT 
dataset for the purposes of striking a balance between accuracy, precision, and recall. 
Additionally, publicly available methods from the Scikit Learning suite of capabilities will 
be trained with those features and assessed using a simplified version of the methodology 
of analysis used by Garcia (2014). That assessment will be compared with the initial 
performance of the Machine Learning methods described in Koroniotis et al. (2019) Bot-
IoT paper.  
Network managers across many network types lack the tools necessary to detect 
many modern threats. Such gaps enable threats such as Botnets to infect a network and 
propagate undetected until called upon to conduct attacks. Machine Learning enables us to 
develop new toolsets to counter problems such as Botnet detection through rapid and 
systemic methods of model training to detect and classify Botnets based on their distinctive 
features. As the environment changes, learning algorithms can be updated to identify and 
capture emerging threats. Current tools in use are largely signature based and detect threats 
that have already been seen but Machine Learning enables us to detect threats based on the 
features of network traffic.  
16 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
17 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. CHOICE OF MODELS 
To begin research for the application of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in the 
detection of Botnets using ARGUS data, the first step was to determine the appropriate ML 
approach for this type of data and successfully train the Random Forest, k-Nearest 
Neighbor, and Support Vector models. The Bot-IoT dataset was published with labeled 
data. Additionally, during discovery of ML methods, unsupervised ML was continuously 
documented as more suitable for tasks involving unlabeled data thus eliminating it as an 
approach. We determined that algorithms typically used for supervised learning problems 
would be most appropriate. The authors of the Bot-IoT dataset (Koroniotis et al., 2019) 
observed the highest precision and recall when they used a linear Support Vector Classifier. 
In one scenario they observed perfect precision at the expense of recall. In another scenario 
they observed perfect recall at the expense of precision. This research will explore whether 
these results can be improved by applying a support vector with a polynomial kernel in lieu 
of a linear kernel (also known as a linear support vector). Another motivating factor in the 
further exploration of Support Vector Classifiers is to determine whether there is a linear 
separation between the two classes of network traffic, Botnet and normal. A polynomial 
kernel applies polynomial functions to the data that shifts data points to allow greater 
flexibility in finding that linear separation. Given that relatively little ML experimentation 
has been conducted on this dataset, a simple algorithm such as the k-Nearest Neighbor will 
also be explored.  
B. THE DATASET AND DATA FORMAT 
The Bot-IoT dataset presented data in many formats. For ease of use and 
uniformity, the data was converted to the CSV format. The dataset is 74 files comprised of 
approximately 74 million network flow records. The dataset is composed of Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS), Denial of Service (DoS), Operating System (OS) 
Fingerprinting, Service Scan, Keylogging, and Data Exfiltration traffic. This dataset was 
reduced to traffic that is less overt and more difficult to detect to engage threats that would 
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likely pose the greatest risk and cause the most damage to the DoDIN. As a result, DoS 
and DDoS traffic were removed from the scope of this research. To reduce the datasets to 
the four remaining target subsets of malicious traffic, Microsoft Excel functions were 
utilized to extract them (Figure 4). The Bot-IoT dataset includes simulated normal traffic 
generated with the Ostinato tool. This traffic adds realistic network flow data to the dataset 
to test the models against one another without creating unnecessary real-world traffic. The 
three models are to be developed and will each use an iterative approach to the training and 
test datasets to compare the efficiency of each model. Both the training and test datasets 
will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. The models will be modularly 
structured such that they may be interchangeably used within the Botnet classification and 
detection code. The code used throughout this chapter is sourced from the author’s code 
repository on GitHub (Ross, 2020). 
 
Figure 4. Four Subsets of Malicious Traffic 
C. CODE STRATEGY 
The purpose in designing the code in a modular format is to streamline the process 
of editing sections of the code without needing to create one from scratch and facilitate 
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future research on different classification algorithms. The format will enable data to be 
loaded and replaced efficiently while clearly differentiating which dataset is loaded to train 
the algorithm. The code structure also provides a modular interface to interchange any 
classification algorithm within the Scikit-learn library such that classification algorithms 
not explored in this research may be applied for future experimentation. 
D. PROCESS FOR FINDING OPTIMAL FEATURES AND NUMBER OF 
FEATURES FOR EACH MODEL 
To identify the number of features that optimizes model performance, a reductionist 
approach will be utilized. The feature reduction will be initiated beginning with all ARGUS 
features from the Bot-IoT dataset into the training datasets. Then, using the feature 
importance function from Scikit-learn’s classification report package, we will be able to 
rank the importance of features in accordance with their importance to the model. Once 
importance is determined, the least important features may be eliminated one at a time until 
the optimal features to maximize predictive performance for each model are found.  
 This process continues until three features remain, and the results of the confusion 
matrices have been recorded. If the model had too few features, it would be overly inclusive 
of results akin to trying to identify a fruit such as an apple based on only color and shape; 
every object that meets color and shape of an apple would be included in the data and thus 
incur excessive false positives. After recording the results of all confusion matrices, the 
outcomes of each model on each dataset will be compared using scores of accuracy, 
precision, and recall. This entire process is shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Feature Selection Process. 
E. CODE EXPLANATION 
The following in Figure 6 import commands enable the use of applicable Machine 
Learning algorithms and requisite mathematical functions. The commands simplify the 
process of importing data by optimizing memory usage for the mathematical functions, 
loading the desired ML algorithms, normalizing data, and formatting the dataset to be 
analyzed according to the applicable data type.  
 
Figure 6. Importing Python and Scikit-learn Modules.  
The next segment of code in Figure 7 is the applicable dataset by the local directory. 
The separation of datasets would enable DoDIN operators to load them individually to 
ultimately determine how each algorithm type performs against various categories of 
Botnet traffic.  
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Figure 7. Loading Datasets.  
The following segment of code in Figure 8 is particularly important in shaping the 
dataset to ensure that the ML algorithms can process information within the datasets. Some 
fields within the datasets include non-numeric values that cannot be processed by the 
algorithms and provide no information that would change the outcome of the models. 
Furthermore, some of the columns of the datasets contain no values and must be dropped 
to ensure that the ML algorithms can properly function. 
 
Figure 8. Data Cleaning and Formatting Steps.  
The next line of code in Figure 9 imports the packages required for the creation of 
the training and test sets to be built within the ML environment. The training sets are used 
to train the models to detect the various types of Botnet traffic and the test sets are used to 
evaluate the ability of each model to detect Botnet traffic.  
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Figure 9. Importing Scikit-Learn Modules.  
The next line in Figure 10 defines the target variables, the dependent variables in 
which the algorithm will use to calculate a relationship between individual features and the 
target variable. Within the dataset, the target variable is the label assigned to each record. 
A label (the value of the row) of 0 indicates that a record is designated as normal traffic. A 
label of 1 indicates that the record designated is Botnet traffic. These labels are the training 
features that are used together to train a model to detect Botnet traffic. 
 
Figure 10. Establishing Target Variables.  
The next section in Figure 11 creates the training and test set using the previously 
imported functions for preparing the ML environment. This command splits the dataset 
into a training set and a test set which both consist of their own set of features and a target 
variable. The segments divide the data into 80% for the training set and 20% for the test 
set.  
 
Figure 11. Create Training and Test Set.  
Support Vector and k-Nearest Neighbor algorithms are designed such that they 
require numeric values to be scaled or normalized. These datasets contain a non-numeric 
categorical feature named state which need to be transformed into a numeric value. The 
most applicable method to transform the feature was OneHotEncoding whereby a column 
in the dataset is created for each category. The state feature has 11 categories, so 11 
columns are created. The values for each record would be a one for the applicable column 
and zero for the remaining 10 columns. For example, if a record had a categorical value of 
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Connected (CON) for state then the newly created CON column would have a value of 1 
and the remaining 10 columns would have a value of 10. Since the OneHotEncoding of 
state assigns the values of zero or one, the remaining numeric features were also 
normalized. 
Next, the preprocessing module is loaded from Scikit-learn into the environment. 
Preprocessing contains the prerequisite functions necessary to perform OneHotEncoding, 
normalization, ColumnTransformer, and pipeline transform as shown in Figure 12. 
Variables are assigned as appropriate to enable transforming the original values to their 
desired values. Modules are also imported to enable the aforementioned functions to be 
placed in a sequential pipeline, and finally execute the commands that transform the 
categorical columns into OneHotEncoded columns (Table 1) and transform the numeric 
values into normalized numeric values. 
 
Figure 12. Data Preprocessing Steps.  
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Table 1. Example of One Hot Encoding. 
 
 
In order to determine which features are the most significant, it is necessary to 
import packages into Python capable of sorting features based on their importance ranking 
as shown in Figure 13. This step is important in creating the model because each 
combination of a dataset and algorithm within the models is hypothesized to require a 
different number of features for the generation of ideal results. The feature importance 
graphs will be products of the imported package output and will show the features based 
on importance for its respective dataset. The graphs will be generated for each of the traffic 
types to identify which features are relevant to each model and help determine a correlation 
between the selection of features and Botnet detection. 
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Figure 13. Determining Feature Importance.  
The next portion of code in Figure 14 is responsible assigning the model that will 
be used on the loaded dataset. It is important because it determines which of the three 
models will be used to detect the Botnet traffic of an assigned dataset. Each of the three 
sections of code has settings that may be adjusted for model optimization. For Random 
Forest the default settings were used because they sufficiently detected and classified the 
Botnet traffic. For k-Nearest Neighbor, choosing the optimal value of K is not 
straightforward and there is not a universal standard that may be applied across datasets as 
the results will vary from one type of dataset to another. For the datasets used in this 
research a value of K=3 is used because it was determined through hyperparameter tuning 
to be the most efficient K value for this model. . Choosing the ideal settings for k-Nearest 
Neighbor requires experimentation and is dependent upon the dataset being used. For 
Support Vector Classifier, the default settings are used except for the kernel. Following 
creation of the Bot-IoT dataset, the authors conducted initial testing using a linear Support 
Vector classifier which produced inconsistent results (Koroniotis et al., 2019). By using a 
Support Vector classifier with a different kernel further insight may be granted into whether 
Service Scan, OS Fingerprinting, Keylogging or Data Exfiltration are linearly separable by 
class, Botnet and normal.   
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Figure 14. Defining Models.  
This portion in Figure 15 trains the model to make predictions using the training 
data. 
 
Figure 15. Training the Model.  
 
The next step of the code in Figure 16 makes predictions on the testing portion of 
the dataset based upon how the model was trained using the training data. 
 
Figure 16. Make Predictions on Test Data.  
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The final portion of the code in Figure 17 collects the model outputs and generates 
a confusion matrix which categorizes the results into four categories, true positive, false 
positive, true negative, and false negative.  
 
Figure 17. Generate Confusion Matrix. 
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Each row in a confusion matrix as shown in Figure 18 represents the actual traffic 
present, while each column represents the predicted traffic (Salazar, 2018). The first row 
of this matrix considers normal traffic (the negative class) in whichTN is representative of  
the number of detections correctly classified as normal traffic (Salazar, 2018). FP 
represents the quantity of traffic incorrectly classified  as suspect (Salazar, 2018). The 
second row within the confusion matrix considers the Botnet traffic (the positive class) FN 
(Salazar, 2018). FN represents the quantity of traffic detections incorrectly classified as 
normal, while TP represents detections  classified correctly as suspect (Salazar, 2018). 
Ideally, a classifier would be characterized only be fully represented by true positives and 
true negatives. Visually, the matrix would be composed of nonzero values in the upper 
diagonal for TP and TN (Salazar, 2018).  
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Figure 18. Confusion Matrix Example.  
Once the confusion matrices have been generated, the results will be graphed and 
analyzed for patterns. If noticeable patterns are observed, then they are assessed and 
compared against correlation calculations, feature importance rankings, and plots of the 
dataset, as applicable.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
Analysis of the model performances against the datasets in this study offers insight 
into potential applications and vulnerabilities of Machine Learning algorithms in the realm 
of network defense. This chapter will discuss the performance of the Random Forest, k-
Nearest Neighbor, and Support Vector Classifier models against the pertinent analyzed 
traffic from the Bot-IoT dataset. Figure 19 below provides a graphical and elementary view 
of the data collection process to present a concise summary of the methodology previously 
discussed. It was taken from snapshots of the results of the Support Vector Classifier 
against the OS Fingerprinting dataset. The upper left flow chart introduces the iterative 
process by which the three algorithm classes were applied to the four datasets. The 
confusion matrix in the upper right of Figure 19 provides an example of the output from a 
single iteration of one of the algorithms. In the confusion matrix, the upper left contains 
the number of true negatives (TN), the upper right contains the number of false positives 
(FP), the lower left contains the number of false negatives (FN), and the lower right 
contains the number of true positives (TP), In this diagram. The arrows drawn from the 
Confusion matrix to the table illustrate the inputs of a single iteration of the algorithm as 
features are removed to search for optimal performance of the algorithm. Finally, the graph 
depicts the algorithm performance using the metrics accuracy, precision, and recall against 
each selection of features.  
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Figure 19. Data Collection Process 
B. FEATURE RANKING 
To execute the data collection process as described in Figure 19 and discussed in 
the methodology section of this research, feature importance for each dataset was 
determined using the Scikit-learn toolkit in Python. Figure 20 shows the output using that 
toolkit to display the varying importance of each feature as it pertains to its associated 
dataset. The features consist of attributes of network flow data in ARGUS format that were 
chosen by the authors of the Bot-IoT dataset. The three letter acronyms represent the 
possible transaction states of a network flow record in each dataset. Exhaustively 
describing the possible combinations of ARGUS attributes is outside the scope of this 
research. For more information reference the manual for ARGUS (openargus.org, n.d.). 
That varying importance provides clarity to the question of whether feature selection 
matters for detection of different types of Botnet traffic. When applied to an operational 
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setting, this research demonstrates that the feature selection plays a critical role in Botnet 
detection because features cannot be applied ubiquitously to a detection model; the feature 
selection must be tailored to the target traffic types. 
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Figure 20. Scikit-Learn Feature Importance Output  
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C. PROCESS OF ANALYSIS 
Once the dataset features had been ranked according to importance and the data 
collection process was complete, analysis was conducted in a row-by-row fashion, 
comparing how each model performed against the various types of network traffic, then a 
column-by-column fashion was used to compare the performance of each model against 
another, and concluded by conducting a holistic analysis of the models. The initial analysis 
was conducted with the data displayed graphically at a scale of 85% to 100% as an 
appropriate range to include the lower performing models. At the 85% to 100% scale, all 
three models performed with greater than 99% precision, accuracy, and recall for the OS 
Fingerprinting and Service Scan datasets. Therefore, the same analysis was conducted at a 
custom scale for each individual model to better capture the more subtle behavioral 
differences of the highest performing models. Experimentation enabled sufficient data to 
be captured to compare the three distinct models’ ability to classify and detect malicious 
traffic. The results of the model’s performance were assessed by comparing accuracy, 
precision, and recall. To reiterate from the previous chapter, accuracy is a measure of a 
model’s percentage of correct predictions, precision is a measure of the effect of false-
positives as given by the equation TP
TP+FP
 , and recall is a measure of the effect of false-
negatives as given by equation TP
TP+FN
. The overall performance of each model on each 
dataset is shown in Table 2. The table shows that each model did well for every metric 
except for k-Nearest Neighbor against the Data Exfiltration dataset, and Support Vector 
against the Keylogging and Data Exfiltration datasets.  
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Table 2. Algorithm Performance Summary.  
 
 
D. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
The four datasets used in this research were derived from the Bot-IoT dataset and 
separated  by traffic type. The Service Scan dataset contains the most Botnet traffic with a 
total of 1,048,575 records, 1,046,582 being Botnet traffic. The OS Fingerprinting dataset 
contains the second most Botnet traffic with a total of 372,759 records, 358,275 of which 
is Botnet traffic. The Keylogging dataset contains the second least Botnet traffic with a 
total of 11,012 records, 1,469 of which is Botnet traffic. These numbers are derived from 
Table 3. The Data Exfiltration dataset contains the least Botnet traffic with a total of 14,602 
records, 118 of which is Botnet traffic. This is reflected in Table 4 later in this chapter 
where further analysis on this observation is also discussed. For Service Scan, OS 
Fingerprinting, and Keylogging, over 90% of the traffic labeled as Botnet traffic had a 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) state of reset (RST) for its value of the state feature.  
TCP is a connection-oriented, end-to-end reliable protocol designed to fit 
into a layered hierarchy of protocols which support multi-network 
applications. The TCP provides for reliable inter-process communication 
between pairs of processes in host computers attached to distinct but 
interconnected computer communication networks. TCP is intended to 
provide a reliable process-to-process communication service in a 
multinetwork environment. The TCP is intended to be a host-to-host 
protocol in common use in multiple networks. (DARPA, 1981)  
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The purpose of the RST state is to reset the connection between two hosts. This 
means that over 90% of the model’s ability to make predictions originated from the value 
of a single feature, TCP State RST. Based upon the observations made on the Bot-IoT 
dataset over the course of this research, the Kali Linux tools that were used to generate the 
Botnet traffic consisted of traffic with significantly more RSTs compared to the normal 
traffic generated by the Ostinato tool. While the Botnet traffic consists of legitimate 
examples of malicious traffic, the normal traffic does not seem to be representative of what 
one would expect in the real-world. This means that the “normal traffic” from the Bot-IoT 
dataset is not representative of normally observed network traffic.  
A study by Arlitt and Williamson (2005) reveals TCP RSTs are surprisingly 
common on the internet. Their research examined various states of TCP 
packets from the University of Calgary’s border router over the course of 
one year. Roughly 15% of all TCP flows were terminated by an RST packet 
after the payload had already been sent in at least one direction. The reset 
rate was even higher for HTTP traffic, with 22% of the flows terminated by 
a client-side RST, and 3% by a server-side RST. In contrast, TCP RSTs 
occurred in less than 0.2% of records labeled as normal traffic in the Bot-
IoT dataset. (Weaver et al., 2009)  
The state feature for the Data Exfiltration dataset was more balanced as it was not 
characterized by a bias in its values. This explains the statistically significant performance 
disparity between each model’s ability to classify Botnet traffic in the Data Exfiltration 
dataset as compared to the other datasets. In short, the datasets bias towards TSP state of 
RST enabled each model to classify Botnet traffic more effectively regarding the OS 
fingerprinting, Service Scan, and Keylogging subsets. 





E. RANDOM FOREST OVERVIEW 
Figure 21 shows that the Random Forest model performed exceptionally well 
against the Service Scan and OS Fingerprinting datasets but also performed well against 
the Keylogging dataset despite having significantly less malicious traffic to train the model.  
The Data Exfiltration dataset contained the lowest number of Botnet records on which the 
algorithm could be trained and did not exhibit a bias in the state feature like the other 
datasets, subsequently the Random Forest models performed less effectively against the 
Data Exfiltration dataset than the other models. Against the Data Exfiltration dataset, the 
Random Forest models yielded no observable patterns for accuracy, precision, or recall. In 
a Random Forest algorithm, each feature is used to separate Botnet traffic from normal 
traffic. The process is repeated until there are no features left and the dataset has been 
divided as much as the features will allow.  
 
Figure 21. Random Forest Performance Summary. 
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F. RANDOM FOREST ON SERVICE SCAN 
Figure 22 shows that Random Forest consistently achieved greater than 99.95% 
accuracy, precision, and recall against the Service Scan dataset. As the number of features 
were reduced, the performance as measured by accuracy, precision, and recall remained 
relatively constant and effective until less than seven features were included in the model. 
 
Figure 22. Random Forest Service Scan Performance Summary. 
G. RANDOM FOREST ON OS FINGERPRINTING 
Figure 23 shows that Random Forest consistently achieved greater than 99.86% 
accuracy, precision, and recall against the OS Fingerprinting dataset. When the number of 
features was reduced to less than seven the model performance dropped slightly, which 




Figure 23. Random Forest OS Fingerprinting Performance Summary. 
H. RANDOM FOREST ON KEYLOGGING 
Figure 24 shows that Random Forest consistently achieved greater than 97.9% 
accuracy, precision, and recall against the Keylogging dataset. There are no obvious 
patterns in performance as the scores for precision and recall randomly oscillate between 




Figure 24. Random Forest Keylogging Performance Summary 
I. RANDOM FOREST ON DATA EXFILTRATION 
Figure 25 shows that the Accuracy metric for Random Forest against the Data 
Exfiltration data consistently achieved greater than 99.8%, while precision and recall 
achieved greater than 91.3% and 88%, respectively. There are no obvious patterns in 





Figure 25. Random Forest Data Exfiltration Performance Summary 
J. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOR OVERVIEW 
Figure 26 shows that the k-Nearest Neighbor model’s performance was like the 
Random Forest model in many respects; the model performed quite well against the Service 
Scan, OS Fingerprinting, and Keylogging traffic but was less impressive against the Data 
Exfiltration traffic. As previously discussed, the Data Exfiltration dataset contained the 
lowest number of Botnet records on which the algorithm could be trained and the Data 
Exfiltration dataset also does not exhibit a bias in the state feature as does the other datasets. 
While the performance on the Data Exfiltration dataset yielded the model’s least 
impressive results, it exhibited sinusoidal patterns with points of perfect performance. In a 
k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm, the features are leveraged to plot groups of Botnet traffic 
versus normal traffic and classify new instances based upon the classification of the 
surrounding group. One selection of features may result in Botnet and normal traffic being 
grouped such that there is a higher number of false positives while another choice of feature 
selection may result in a high number of false negatives. 
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Figure 26. K-Nearest Neighbor Performance Summary 
K. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOR ON SERVICE SCAN 
Figure 27 shows that the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm consistently achieved 
greater than 99.995% accuracy, precision, and recall against the Service Scan dataset. As 
the number of features were reduced, the performance as measured by accuracy and 




Figure 27. K-Nearest Neighbor Service Scan Performance Summary 
L. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOR ON OS FINGERPRINTING 
Figure 28 shows that the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm consistently achieved 
greater than 99.9% accuracy, precision, and recall against the OS Fingerprinting dataset. 
Generally, the overall performance remained relatively consistent through feature 
reduction until less than five features were used. The k-Nearest Neighbor best performed 




Figure 28. K-Nearest Neighbor OS Fingerprinting Performance Summary 
M. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOR ON KEYLOGGING 
Figure 29 shows that the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm consistently achieved 
greater than 98.3% in accuracy, precision, and recall against the Keylogging dataset. There 
are no obvious patterns in performance as the scores for precision and recall randomly 




Figure 29. K-Nearest Neighbor Keylogging Performance Summary 
N. K-NEAREST NEIGHBOR ON DATA EXFILTRATION  
Figure 30 shows that the Accuracy metric for the k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm 
consistently achieved greater than 99.7%, while precision and recall achieved greater than 
83.0% and 78.9%, respectively, against the Data Exfiltration dataset. There are two points 
at which the algorithm reaches perfect performance. Those points are when the algorithm 




Figure 30. K-Nearest Neighbor Data Exfiltration Performance Summary 
O. SUPPORT VECTOR OVERVIEW 
Figure 31 shows that the Support Vector results were inconsistent and varied in 
accuracy, precision, and recall with each dataset. Support Vector performed well on 
Service Scan and OS Fingerprinting but performed erratically on Keylogging. Support 
Vector yielded no useful results against Data Exfiltration dataset due to the low number of 
Botnet instances that were available to train the model as well as the difference between 
Data Exfiltration and the other datasets regarding the TCP state. In a Support Vector 
algorithm, the features are leveraged to calculate where a separation is drawn between the 
classification of Botnet or normal traffic is made. One selection of features may result in 
the Support Vector that separates classifications of Botnet and normal traffic being drawn 
such that there is a higher number of false positives while another choice of feature 




Figure 31. Support Vector Performance Summary 
P. SUPPORT VECTOR ON SERVICE SCAN 
Figure 32 shows that the Support Vector algorithm consistently achieved greater 
than 99.83% accuracy, precision, and recall against the Service Scan dataset. Regardless 
of the selection of features, the performance as measured by accuracy, precision, and recall 




Figure 32. Support Vector Service Scan Performance Summary 
Q. SUPPORT VECTOR ON OS FINGERPRINTING 
Figure 33 shows that the Support Vector algorithm consistently achieved greater 
than 99.69% accuracy, precision, and recall against the Service Scan dataset. Regardless 
of the selection of features, the performance as measured by accuracy, precision, and recall 




Figure 33. Support Vector OS Fingerprinting Performance Summary 
R. SUPPORT VECTOR ON KEYLOGGING 
Figure 34 shows that while performance as measured by accuracy is consistently 
greater than 98.5%, Support Vector results were widely inconsistent and varied in precision 
and recall (varying from 88% and up) through each iteration of feature selection. As the 
number of features were reduced, precision and recall alternated in results, as one metric 
improved the other would decrease. This performance can best be explained by the 
selection of features changing where the line of separation between Botnet and normal 
traffic is made. The iteration of feature selection caused the Support Vector that determines 
the separation between Botnet and normal traffic to oscillate between having a higher 




Figure 34. Support Vector Keylogging Performance Summary 
S. SUPPORT VECTOR ON DATA EXFILTRATION 
At first glance, the performance of Support Vector on the Data Exfiltration dataset 
shown in Figure 35 is deceiving. While performance as measured by accuracy is 
consistently greater than 99.5%, precision is very inconsistent with values ranging between 
46.1% and 100%, and the value for recall never exceeds 46.6%. This is likely due to the 
small amount of Data Exfiltration traffic in the dataset on which the algorithm could be 
trained. There were only 118 instances of Data Exfiltration traffic in the dataset compared 
to 14,484 instances of normal traffic. If an algorithm were to classify all instances in the 
Data Exfiltration dataset as normal, then it would still achieve an accuracy of just under 
99.2%. However, in that same notional scenario the recall would be 0%. Precision is 
undefined in this notional scenario because it is zero true positives divided by the sum of 




Figure 35. Support Vector Data Exfiltration Performance Summary 
 
Table 4. Notional Data Exfiltration Accuracy Matrix 
 
 
T. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis conducted during this research focused on the performance of 
Machine Learning models and how model performance is impacted by feature selection 
and the quantity and quality of data. Built-in Python tools from Scikit-Learn modules were 
used to calculate the importance of the features relative to each dataset. The team was able 
to demonstrate that feature importance varies between datasets, which may affect the 
optimization of ML model performance and the ability to successfully detect Botnet traffic. 
This research found that some traffic types were consistently easier to detect. The order of 
the datasets by performance from best to worst were Service Scan, OS Fingerprinting, 
Keylogging, and Data Exfiltration. Of note, the k-Nearest Neighbor model exhibited a 
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notable pattern of behavior against the Data Exfiltration dataset in which a local maximum 
was reached during the sequence of feature reduction. No other scenario exhibited this 
behavior. Additionally, analysis showed a positive correlation between model performance 
against a given dataset and the prevalence of Botnet traffic. Finally, analysis revealed that 
different models performed better overall against some datasets versus others. From best 
overall performance to worst performance, the order of the models are Random Forest, k-
Nearest Neighbor, and Support Vector. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The primary objective of this research was to investigate the application of Machine 
Learning (ML) to ARGUS data to ultimately answer three research questions regarding the 
broader application of ML for network security. The three research questions are: (1) what 
operations and maintenance considerations apply to long term utilization of ML algorithms 
against Botnet traffic; (2) which, if any, existing Machine Learning algorithms or 
techniques could be usefully applied to analyze network flow data: and (3) what caveats/
limitations must be considered by consumers of alerts produced by ML analysis of network 
flow data?   
1. Research Question 1 
The first research question, what operations and maintenance considerations apply 
to long term utilization of ML algorithms against Botnet traffic, shaped the perspective of 
this research towards long term ML for use in defense of the DoDIN. This research 
highlighted two long-term ML utilization considerations regarding operations and 
maintenance for the detection of Botnet traffic. The first consideration that was identified 
for an ML solution identified was the dataset used to train the ML models. The comparison 
between the results of this research and the results of the previous BOT-IoT research as 
shown in Table 5 indicated that the ideal approach to detect Botnets or otherwise malicious 
traffic was to train the ML model to detect a specific type of traffic rather than several types 
of traffic at the same time. This is important because ML models learn to distinguish 
between the data presented. However, if one were to attempt to train the ML model to 
detect and distinguish between multiple types of traffic it becomes significantly less 
effective. In the case of this research, the quality and size of the dataset were determined 
to be important. The datasets were shaped by two critical factors, the quality of the data 
and the quantity of data. In terms of quality, the dataset must properly represent the TTPs 
employed for that type of traffic because ML model’s performance is a reflection of the 
quality of data on which it was trained. For example, if an ML model is trained with data 
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to classify all red and round objects as apples it will misclassify anything red and round 
that is not an apple. The normal traffic must also be representative of typical internet traffic 
seen in a NOC environment. In terms of volume, the larger datasets containing relevant 
instances of each traffic to be made available to the ML model for training increased the 
effectiveness the models’ overall performance. The characteristics size and quality that 
shaped the datasets used to train ML models were highly influential in the results of this 
research. 
Table 5. Random Forest Model Performance against Each Data Type 
 
This table compares the results of Random Forest against each dataset as compared to the results on 
those same Botnet traffic types as reported by the authors of the Bot-IoT Paper. The Bot-IoT paper 
lists scores of zero for precision and recall. 
 
The second consideration of this research for long-term ML utilization was the 
selection of features within each dataset used to train each ML model. Each model’s 
features had to be tailored for the type of traffic targeted for detection and for the model 
used for detection. This research showed that feature importance and selection are 
significant and vary for each traffic type and each ML model. However, the features that 
were selected for the datasets in this research may not yield the same results on a dataset 
that is more representative of realistic Botnet and normal traffic. Therefore, ranking by 
feature importance should be done on the dataset followed by feature selection being 
performed for the model.  
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The quality and quantity of data shape the management and accumulation of 
datasets to be used to train ML models. While this point will be emphasized in greater 
depth, careful management and strict filtering must be considered when collecting and 
organizing datasets for use in ML models for network defense. Data can quickly become 
obsolete in the modern cyber environment, sustained efforts to maintain an up-to-date 
database of existing threat traffic types is paramount system maintenance and operational 
success. 
2. Research Question 2 
The second research question, which, if any, existing Machine Learning algorithms 
or techniques could be usefully applied to analyze network flow data, became self-evident 
during the analysis of our findings. There is no “best” Machine Learning model that can 
be applied universally to all datasets, but given a particular dataset there could be an ideal 
model. Between the ML algorithms explored over the course of this research, Random 
Forest consistently outperformed the other models. Random Forest proved to be less 
computationally complex. Computational complexity closely ties to the demand for 
computational resources, the more complex the higher the resource demand. The 
characteristic serves as an attractive quality in resource constrained environments which 
should be weighed in any decision-making process for the selection of an ML solution for 
network security. 
To offer perspective, this research was accomplished using a COTS computer with 
16 gigabytes of memory, a 4-gigahertz processor, and a 4-gigabyte graphics card. While 
computational complexity and resource demand can be somewhat mitigated by increasing 
the capabilities of a computer or distributing the workload over multiple devices, Random 
Forest starkly contrasted the other models by more quickly and accurately classifying the 
datasets for each traffic type. 
3. Research Question 3 
The third research question, what caveats/limitations must be considered by 
consumers of alerts produced by ML analysis of network flow data, presented noteworthy 
items of consideration discovered over the course of this research. While the Random 
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Forest algorithm performed well there was always a risk of false positives and false 
negatives which was demonstrated in Chapter IV. The risk of false positives contributed to 
the discussion regarding the question of what caveats/limitations must be considered by 
consumers of alerts produced by Machine Learning analysis of network flow data. This 
risk may be increased once an ML model has been trained using datasets composed of more 
realistic examples of network traffic. One way to mitigate the impact of that risk would be 
to incorporate context to the results of ML models by comparing traffic that is typically 
discovered earlier vs. later in an Offensive Cyber Campaign (OCO). OCOs leverage 
various methods and techniques that lie beyond the scope of this discussion, but for 
simplicity’s sake we will surmise that regarding the detection of certain types of traffic, the 
order of detection matters. For example, an advanced persistent threat (APT) will make 
some effort to enumerate the target network by using information gathering tactics. At 
some point during the OCO, the APT may use information gained about the target network 
to conduct some action such as exfiltrating data. In this example, the context of the type of 
traffic being detected matters. So, if the operator or system defending the network detects 
Service Scan or OS Fingerprinting followed by data exfiltration against the same network 
addresses, then the detection is much less likely to be a false positive. It is important to 
recognize that this information could be used against the defender. If the dataset used to 
train the ML model is not tightly controlled, then the APT could corrupt the dataset in an 
attempt to circumvent detection. The risk of this scenario would be the highest in an 
environment where the ML model is being trained using live traffic.  
The three research questions explored over the course of this research culminate in 
enabling us to answer an overarching question pertaining to network security. Can ML 
using ARGUS data be used to detect Botnets for network defense and security. The results 
of experimentation and analysis conducted over the course of the research support the 
hypothesis that ML can accurately and reliably use ARGUS data to detect the presence of 
Botnets and traffic representative of Botnet traffic. The ML algorithms tested each 
achieved various levels of performance from perfect detection and classification to 
unreliable. We can conclude that when appropriate models are selected and properly 
trained, ML can serve as an early warning system for Botnet threats to a network and to 
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automate elements of the detection process to better support network operators. More 
experimentation and testing are warranted before implementing new tactics and techniques 
to defend the DoDIN, some suggestions are outlined in the Future Work section of this 
chapter. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Dataset Creation 
Datasets could be created for each broad type of malicious traffic. They should be 
balanced between normal and malicious traffic and should also be as representative of each 
traffic type as possible. Including a broad range of realistic traffic according to type may 
aid future ML models in being able to detect malicious traffic in operational environments. 
One method of achieving such results would be to include more stealthy attack tactics and 
reduce the overall number of both overt and DoS attacks in the training and test datasets.  
The production of datasets may be an ongoing and evolving endeavor. As 
understanding of the cyber domain evolves, so will the techniques and tactics implemented 
by nefarious actors. ML algorithms are susceptible to variations in the data which may lead 
to misclassification of network flow data. For example, if the model continually learns 
based upon live traffic inputs, a malicious actor may contaminate the training data by 
incrementally injecting traffic that is more representative of the malicious traffic or 
exploitation method that the actor intends to send. Essentially, the malicious actor 
desensitizes the ML model to the malicious traffic. Therefore, DOD must maintain tight 
control over how models are trained. 
2. Model Optimization 
Each of the models explored during this research have parameters that can be 
optimized to increase performance. Due to time limitations, the optimization of those 
parameters could not be fully explored. Once realistic datasets become available, further 
research is needed to identify the proper parameter values for each model on each dataset. 
For example, research could be conducted to evaluate the results of a Support Vector using 
a different kernel or evaluate a Random Forest with decision trees of varying breadth and 
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depth. Exploration of alternate kernels or variations to the algorithms may yield more 
favorable results, particularly for models that initially fail to achieve acceptable results.  
3. Model Testing in a Training Environment 
Once the datasets have been produced as recommended and the parameters for each 
model have been optimized, the models need to be tested in a training environment. Since 
the code that was developed for this research is readily available for use towards the efforts 
of follow-on research, moving from an academic to a lab environment for testing is feasible 
in the immediate future. The idea structure for testing based upon the scope of this research 
would be for a Red Team to conduct a cyber campaign against a target in the training 
environment. Packet Captures of the traffic from the Red Team would be converted to an 
ARGUS comma separated value file, then that file would be processed by a trained ML 
model to see whether the Red Team’s malicious traffic is properly classified.  
4. Neural Network Exploration 
Due to time constraints, exploration of the use of neural networks in the context of 
this research was not feasible. Neural networks may serve as a viable option in the use of 
ML to detect Botnets.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
1. Time 
The single greatest limitation to this research was time, due to the structure of the 
academic experience at the Naval Postgraduate school, students must set attainable goals 
to be accomplish during their limited tenure. As a result, initial ambitions to develop a user 
interface and conduct a user study were quickly tapered to focus on the most important 
aspects of ML utilizing ARGUS data. 
2. Knowledge 
The research process in pursuing ML applications was as much a desire to learn as 
it was to meet graduation requirements. The research process taught our team a great deal 
about ML, coding in Python, and cyber threats. With more time and the knowledge our 
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team gained over the course of this research we could have accomplished a great deal more 
in this area of study.  
3. Dataset 
While the BOT-IoT dataset provided our research team with an exceptional way to 
conduct our research by having ARGUS data in a convenient format, the dataset was 
limited in quantity of Keylogging and Data exfiltration training data. This is a limiting 
factor because as described earlier in the paper, effectiveness of the models was highly 
influenced by the quality and quantity of the data. 
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